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"DISTINCTIONS WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE":
HOW THE SIXTH CIRCUIT MISREAD
ROMER V. EVANS
JASON D. KmePL
I. INTRODUCTION
"'No, because I would have to tell you that right now we would not conform-we
would not send our white children to the Negro schools."'"
When the Supreme Court struck down the doctrine of "separate but equal"2 in the
field of public education3 and later mandated that public schools end racial
segregation "with all deliberate speed,"4 resistance to the social policy announced
by the Court was expected.5 In fact, many of the lower courts displayed hostility and
abhorrence toward the Brown v. Board of Education decisions. One court held that
the Brown decisions did not require "the states [to] mix persons of different races
in the schools.... [The] Constitution, in other words, does not require integration.
[It] merely forbids the use of governmental power to enforce segregation."' Another
judge scorned in response to Brown II, "' [T]he white man has a right to maintain
his racial integrity and it can't be done so easily in integrated schools .... We will
not name any date or issue any order ... The School Board should further study
this question and perhaps take further action, maybe an election." 7 As a result of
the hostility from the lower courts, only 2.3% of the black children in the South
were attending desegregated schools ten years after Brown L'
An important lesson learned from the aftermath of the Brown decisions was that
the Supreme Court lacks the power to enforce its decisions, especially those with
* J.D. Candidate, 1999, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; BA , 1996,
DePauw University. Iwould like to thank Professor David C. Williams for his advice, critique, and
suggestions regarding this Note. I would also like to especially thank my parents for their
inexhaustible love, support, and encouragement throughout my life. This Note is dedicated to my
grandparents, Dr. William and Mrs. Betty Detroy.
1. DAvI M. O'BRIN, STORM CENTER THE SUPREME COURT INAwmCANPOLIICS 359
(3d ed. 1993) (quoting S. Emory Rogers in response to a question from Chief Justice Warren as
to whether there would be an honest attempt from the South to conform to the Court's decree in
Brown v. Board ofEducation, 349 U.S. 294 (1955)).
2. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
3. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1).
4. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,301 (1955) (Brown 17).
5. See O'BRIEN, supra note 1, at 359.
6. Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
7. J.W. PELTASON, FIFrY-EIGHT LONELY MEN 119 (1971) (quoting the comment by Judge
J. Whitfield Davidson quoted in the Associated Press dispatch, July 30, 1959) (omissions in
original) (alteration added)).
8.See id.
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great social and emotional consequences.9 This lesson has recently been re-taught
to the pupils of constitutional law. Just as the lower courts were reluctant to follow
the Court's mandate in Brown II, some courts now appear reluctant to follow the
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Romer v. Evans."
The Supreme Court in Romer struck down an amendment to the Colorado
Constitution which prohibited all legislative, executive, and judicial action procured
to benefit gays and lesbians." Gay rights groups heralded the decision as a huge
victory in their struggle for equal rights. However, gay rights groups were shocked
when, less than a year later, the Sixth Circuit in Equality Foundation of Greater
Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati,2 upheld a similar amendment to the
Cincinnati City Charter. 3 Those in favor of the city charter amendment hailed the
ruling as "a valid distinction that did not run afoul of Romer."4 Thus, the debate
over what impact Romer will have on the ultimate landscape of gay rights moved
from academia to the court room. If Equality Foundation proves to be a harbinger
of the judicial response.to Romer, then the landmark victory for gay rights may not
be realized for some time to come.
This Note posits that the Sixth Circuit's decision in Equality Foundation
represefits a ruling that misreads the Court's holding in Romer." The analysis of
Equality Foundation begins by first presenting a case history of Romer.6 Next, a
brief case history of Equality Foundation illustrates the sharp political debate
which took place in Cincinnati. In the end, this Note argues that the Sixth Circuit
failed to materially distinguish the two cases, and as a result, failed to follow the
command of the Supreme Court.
II. CASE HISTORY
The thrust of this Note argues that the Sixth Circuit failed to materially
distinguish Equdlity Foundation from Romer v. Evans. Accordingly, an
examination of the respective case histories follows below.
9.AsAlexanderHamilton explained in Federalist 78, the judiciary will always be the "least
dangerous" branch of government TEFEnDE.RALiSTNo. 78, at 227 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy
P. Fairfield ed., Johns Hopkins 2d ed. 1981).
10. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
11.Id. at 624.
12.128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997), reh 'g denied, Nos. 94-3855,94-3973,94-4280,1998 WL
101701 (6th Cir. Feb. 5, 1998), cert denied, 119 S. Ct 365 (1998).
13. See David E. Rovella, Gay GroupsAre Angry at SexualPreference Ruling, NAT'L L.J,
Nov. 10, 1997, atA9.
14.Id.
15. The Sixth Circuit's reluctance to follow the direction of the Supreme Court is reminiscent
of the South's defiance of the Brown decisions.
16. Because the Court's decision is somewhat ambiguous, how a court chooses to read Romer
determines how a court decides Equality Foundation.
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A. Romer v. Evans
On November 3, 1993, 53.4% of voters in Colorado passed an amendment to the
Colorado Constitution commonly known as Amendment 2.17 Amendment 2 stated:
No protected status based on homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation.
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor
any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of, or entitle any person or class of
persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status
or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all
respects self-executing.'
The immediate effect of this enactment was that it invalidated all current state and
local legislative, regulatory, and administrative anti-discrimination measures
protecting gays and lesbians. 9
On November 12, 1992, some individuals, three cities, and a school district
(collectively "plaintiffs") filed suit in the Denver District Court claiming that
Amendment 2 was unconstitutional, and thus, a preliminary injunction should be
imposed on its enforcement.2" The district court granted the preliminary injunction
and defendants appealed the court's decision to the Colorado Supreme Court.21
The Colorado Supreme Court afrmed the district court's grant of the preliminary
injunction.22 In doing so, the court held that the "Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution protects the fundamental right to participate equally in
the political process, and that any legislation or state constitutional amendment
which infringes on this right by 'fencing out' an independently identifiable class of
persons must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny."23 The court held that
Amendment 2 infringed upon this fundamental right because it "bars gay men,
lesbians, and bisexuals from having an effective voice in governmental affairs
insofar as those persons deem it beneficial to seek legislation that would protect
them from discrimination based on their sexual orientation.
24
Although no court had ever invalidated a statute or amendment based upon a
purported fundamental right to equal participation in the political process,25 the
Colorado court supported its ruling by relying upon two lines of cases. First, the
court analyzed voting rights cases and distilled from them the principle that "laws
may not create unequal burdens on identifiable groups with respect to the right to
17. See Brief for Petitioners at 4, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039).
18. CoLO. CoNsT. art. H, § 30b (emphasis in original) (held unconstitutional in Romer, 517
U.S. at 635-36).
19. See Brief for Petitioners at 3,Romer (No. 94-1039).
20. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335,1339 (Colo. 1994) (en bane) (Evans fl), aff'd, 517
U.S. 620 (1996).
21. See id.
22. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270,1286 (Colo. 1993) (en bane) (Evans1).
23. Id. at 1282 (quoting Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 5 (1971)).
24. Id. at 1285.
25. See Anthony M. Dillot Romer v. Evans and the Constitutionality of Higher Lawmaking,
60 ALB. L. REv. 361, 367-68 (1996).
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participate in the political process absent a compelling state interest."26 Second, the
Colorado court relied upon cases involving direct limits imposed upon the
democratic process." Most important and most closely related, the court relied
upon Hunter v. Ericksonu which involved an amendment to the Akron City Charter
preventing the city council from "implementing any ordinance dealing with racial,
religious, or ancestral discrimination in housing without the approval of the
majority of the voters of Akron." '29 The Colorado court interpreted broadly the
language in Hunter concerning the disadvantaging of a singled-out group in the
political process.3" "[T]he State may no more disadvantage any particular group by
making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf . ". . . " From this language,
the Colorado court inferred the existence of a fundamental right to equal
participation in the political process.2
The court also rejected the State's argument that Hunter was solely a race case,
and thus, should be applied only to groups who qualify as a suspect class already
falling under the protection of strict scrutiny.33 Accordingly, the Colorado Supreme
Court applied strict scrutiny and invalidated Amendment 2 under the Equal
Protection Clause because Amendment 2 infringed upon a fundamental right-the
right to equal participation in the political process.34 After the Colorado Supreme
Court ruling, the State sought certiorari review of the decision before the United
States Supreme Court, which was denied. 5
On remand from the Colorado Supreme Court, the issue for the district court was
whether Amendment 2 was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.3 6
The district court ruled that Amendment 2 violated homosexuals' fundamental right
to equal participation in the political process and that no state interest advanced
was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. Therefore, the court
entered a written order permanently enjoining the enforcement of Amendment 2.31
Colorado subsequently sought review of the trial court's decision from the
Colorado Supreme Court in Evans II. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court
upheld its previous ruling as well as the trial court's determination that no state
interest passed strict scrutiny. Accordingly, the Colorado Supreme Court issued a
permanent injunction.38
26. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1279.
27. See id. at 1279-82.
28.393 U.S. 385 (1969).
29.Id. at 386.
30. See Jane S. Schater, Romer v. Evans andDemocracy's Domain, 50 VAND. L. REv. 361,
376 (1997).
31. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393.
32. See Evans, 854 P.2d at 1282.
33. See Schacter, supra note 30, at 376.
34. See Evans, 854 P.2d at 1284-86.
35. See Romer v. Evans, 510 U.S. 959 (1993).
36. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335,1339 (Colo. 1994) (en bane), afid, 517 U.S. 620
(1996).
37. See id. at 1339-40.
38. See id. at 1350.
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On February 21, 1995, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the Colorado Supreme Court decision in Evans II." Although the
petitioners' question for review was: "'Whether a popularly enacted state
constitutional amendment precluding special state or local legal protections for
homosexuals and bisexuals violates a fundamental right of independently
identifiable, yet non-suspect, classes to seek such special protections,""'4 the
Supreme Court atrmed the ultimate judgment of the Colorado Supreme Court (that
Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause), "but on a rationale different
from that adopted by the State Supreme Court."'"
Instead of deciding the case based upon whether or not homosexuals'
fundamental right to equal participation in the political process had been
unconstitutionally infringed under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court declared
that Amendment 2 constituted a "literal" violation of equal protection, and thus,
defied the traditional equal protection inquiry into whether or not the legislative
classification bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.42 Even under a
rational basis test, the Court declared that because Amendment 2 was "born of
animosity," it therefore could not be "directed to an identifiable legitimate purpose
or discrete objective."43
In sum, the Court did not invalidate Amendment 2 as a violation of equal
protection on the same grounds as did the Colorado Supreme Court. Rather, the
Romer Court held that Amendment 2 failed the rational basis test not only because
it imposed an unusually broad harm upon an identifiable group, but also because
the Court believed that it must have been singularly based on simple hostility
toward that group.
B. Equality Foundation
1. The District Court
The struggle for equal rights by gays and lesbians in Cincinnati paralleled that of
the events in Colorado. Although the battle over Amendment 2 in Colorado was
waged on a statewide theater as opposed to the City of Cincinnati arena, the
similarities between the two fights are compelling.
Early victories were scored for gay rights when the Cincinnati City Council
passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Ordinance ("EEO") in 1991, and later
39. See Romer v. Evans, 513 U.S. 1146 (1995).
40. John Daniel Dailey & Paul Farley, Colorado 'sAmendment 2: A Result in Search of a
Reason, 20 HARv. J.L. &PuB. PoL'Y 215,242 (1996) (quoting Petition for Certiorari at i, Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039)).
41.Romer, 517 U.S. at 626.
42. See id at 631-32. The Court also avoided the question as to whether or not homosexuals
constituted a suspect or quasi-suspect class. See id.
43.Id. at 621.
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the Human Rights Ordinance ("HRO") in 1992." The EEO prohibited the city from
discriminating in its hiring for employment and in its appointments to city boards
and commissions on the basis of sexual orientation.45 The HRO, on the other hand,
prohibited discrimination in private employment, public accommodations, and
housing on the basis of sexual orientation." However, the opposition countered
these early victories.
The opponents to these ordinances organized themselves into a group called
"Take Back Cincinnati," later known as "Equal Rights Not Special Rights"
("ERNSR"). 4 7 ERNSR drafted an amendment to the Charter of the City of
Cincinnati and collected enough signatures to have it placed on the ballot in the
upcoming general election.4" The proposed amendment, commonly known as Issue
3, read as follows:
NO SPECIAL CLASS STATUS MAY BE GRANTED BASED UPON
SEXUAL ORIENTATION, CONDUCT OR RELATIONSHIPS.
The City of Cincinnati and its various Boards and Commissions may not
enact, adopt, enforce or administer any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy
which provides that homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status,
conduct, or relationship constitutes, entitles, or otherwise provides a person with
the basis to have any claim of minority or protected status, quota preference or
other preferential treatment.
This provision of the City Charter shall in all respects be self-executing. Any
ordinance, regulation, rule or policy enacted before this amendment is adopted
that violates the foregoing prohibition shall be null and void and of no force or
effect.
49
The struggle for and against this amendment proposal was highly debated and
emotional with neither side refraining from punching below the belt. Opponents of
Issue 3 associated the amendment proposal with the likes of Hitler, the KKK, and
McCarthey. ° On the other hand, the proponents of Issue 3 not only lobbied voters
on the theme of denying "special rights" for gays and lesbians, but more vulgarly
campaigned for votes by characterizing gays and lesbians as pedophiles and
characterizing homosexuality as simply a matter of "'who one chooses to have sex
with."'"1 In the end, the voters of Cincinnati succumbed to the "special rights"
44. See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417,
421 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd and vacated, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 518 U.S. 1001
(1996).
45. See id The EEO also prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, disability,
religion, national or ethnic origin, age, HIV status, Appalachian regional ancestry, and marital
status. See id.
46. See iL The HRO also prohibited discrimination on the other bases that the EEO prohibited.
See supra note 45. Moreover, the HRO provided exemptions for fraternal and religious
organizations. See Equality Found., 860 F. Supp. at 421.
47. See Equality Found., 860 F. Supp. at 422.
48. See id.
49. Id. Note the similarities to Amendment 2. See supra text accompanying note 18.
50. See Equality Found., 860 F. Supp. at 422.
51. Id. (quoting Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2, at 10).
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propaganda and passed the amendment proposal by a 62% majority.52 Although
defeated, the opponents to Issue 3 did not roll over. Instead, they moved the fight
from the ballot box to the court room and scored two huge victories.
On November 8, 1993, Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. ("Equality
Foundation") filed suit in federal district court claiming that Issue 3 violated their
constitutional rights to equal protection, free association, and redress of grievances
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.53 On November 19, 1993, the district court, following an evidentiary
hearing, issued a preliminary injunction against the implementation of Issue 3.54
Subsequently, in one of the most favorable decisions for gay rights, the district
court ordered a permanent injunction against the enforcement of Issue 3.55
In ordering the permanent injunction, the district court made several ground
breaking conclusions of law, which were based on equally ground breaking findings
of fact. The court deduced these facts from an enormity of expert testimony given
in both the preliminary and permanent injunction hearings.56 Some of the decisive
findings of fact were as follows:
2. Sexual orientation is a characteristic which exists separately and independently
from sexual conduct or behavior.
8. Sexual orientation is set in at a very early age-3 to 5 years-and is not only
involuntary, but is unamenable to change.
9. Sexual orientation bears no relation to an individual's ability to perform, contribute
to, or participate in, society.
13. Homosexuals have suffered a history of pervasive, irrational and invidious
discrimination in government and private employment, in political organization and in
all facets of society in general, based on their sexual orientation.
15. Gays, lesbians and bisexuals are an identifiable group based on their sexual
orientation and their shared history of discrimination based on that characteristic.
17. In at least certain crucial respects, gays, lesbians and bisexuals are relatively
politically powerless.
22. Amending the city charter is a far more onerous and resource-consuming task than
is lobbying the City Council or city administration for legislation .... 17
From these and other findings of fact, the court delivered a powerful blow to the
opponents of gay equal rights. First, the court held on three different grounds that
52. See id.
53. See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 838 F. Supp. 1235,
1236 (S.D. Ohio 1993). Equality Foundation is an Ohio not-for-profit corporation formed to
oppose ERNSR's efforts to promote an anti-gay initiative in Cincinnati. Other plaintiffs included
several gay Cincinnati residents, as well as Housing Opportunities Made Equal (H.O.M.E.), a civil
rights organization with a diverse membership of people of all races and sexual orientations that
promotes equal housing opportunities in Cincinnati. See Equality Found., 860 F. Supp. at 423.
54. See Equality Found., 838 F. Supp. at 1243.
55. See Equality Found., 860 F. Supp. at 449.
56. See id. at 424-26 (summarizing the expert testimony given).
57.Id. at 426-27.
1999]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Issue 3 violated the Equal Protection Clause. 8 Second, the court held that the
provision violated the First Amendment by unconstitutionally deterring political
speech and association. 9 Finally, the court held that Issue 3 was unconstitutionally
vague in violation of due process.60
In confronting the equal protection claim, the district court first discussed the
constitutional standards of review under the Equal Protection Clause. Specifically,
the court reiterated that if a law infringes upon a fundamental right or makes a
classification based upon a suspect class, then it will be reviewed under strict
scrutiny.6' Under strict scrutiny, the law is unconstitutional unless it is narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.62 Further, the court explained that if
legislation classifies on the basis of a quasi-suspect class, then it will be subjected
to intermediate scrutiny, thus, the law must be substantially related to an important
government interest in order to be constitutional."3 Finally, the court stated that
under rational basis review, a law must be rationally related to a legitimate
government interest." After setting out the standards of review, the court held that
Issue 3 violated gays' and lesbians' fundamental right to equal access to the
political process," that sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect classification," and
that Issue 3 was not rationally related to a legitimate government interest.6 7
In finding that Issue 3 violated homosexuals' fundamental right to'equal access
to the political process, the district court relied upon the same line of cases used by
the Colorado Supreme Court in Evans. Specifically, the court took great pains to
defend its reliance on Hunter to declare that indeed such a fundamental right
exists.6 ' In doing so, the court emphasized that Hunter transcended a simple case
of racial classification, explaining that the United States Supreme Court in Hunter
spoke in race-neutral terms and relied solely on voting cases "which had nothing
to do with any racial classification."69 Moreover, the court illuminated the fact that
the Supreme Court in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 17" made reference
to the "Hunter Doctrine," inferring that if Hunter was only a race case, then the
"Hunter Doctrine" would refer to nothing more than the principle that
classifications based upon race are subjected to strict scrutiny.7 Accordingly, the
court concluded, that the "Hunter Doctrine," requires that "'the State may no more
disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to enact legislation
58.S ee id. at 449.
59. See id. at 446.
60.See id. at 449.
61. See id. at 429-30.
62. See id. at 430.
63. See id.
64.Seeid. at 441.
65. See id. at 433-34.
66. See id. at 436.
67. See id. at 441.
68. See id. at 431-33 (citing Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969)).
69.Id. at 431.
70.458 U.S. 457 (1982).
71.EqualiftFound., 860 F. Supp. at 431 n.11 (quoting Seattle Sch. Dist No. 1,458 U.S. at
473).
[Vol. 74:991
"DISTINCTIONS WITHO UT A DIFFERENCE"
in its behalf than it may dilute any person's vote or give any group a smaller
representation than another of comparable size."' 72 Further, the doctrine exists
separately and independently from "race cases."" In sum, the court, like the
Colorado court in Evans, concluded that Issue 3 violated homosexuals' fundamental
right to equal access to the political process "by singling out and disadvantaging an
independently identifiable group of citizens-gays, lesbians, and bisexuals-by
making it more difficult for that group to enact legislation in its behalf."74
Next, the district court took up the issue of whether or not gays and lesbians
constitute a quasi-suspect class." First, the court concluded that homosexuals "have
suffered a history of invidious discrimination based upon their sexual orientation."76
Second, the court concluded that sexual orientation bears no relation to an
individual's ability to perform in, participate in, or contribute to society." Third,
the court concluded that sexual orientation "is a characteristic beyond the control
of the individual," and also exists independently of any conduct.7" Fourth, the court
determined that, although not a wholly politically powerless group, homosexuals
suffer significant political obstacles.79 For example, the court found that other
minority groups refused to form coalitions with homosexual groups because of their
strong dislike for gays and lesbians. Thus, the court concluded that homosexuals'
inability to form coalitions seriously retards their political power."0 Finally, the
court held that Bowers v. Hardwick"' does not pose an impediment to a finding that
homosexuals constitute a quasi-suspect class." The court's reasoning was that,
although Bowers constitutionally permits the criminalization of homosexual
sodomy, "sexual orientation... exists independently of any conduct," and therefore,
Bowers is not controlling.' As a result, the court held that gays, lesbians, and
72. Id. at 432 (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393 (emphasis omitted)).
73.Id.
74. Id. at 433-34.
75. See id. at 434.
Although the Supreme Court has never articulated a precise test for determining
which groups should be regarded as suspect or quasi-suspect, the Court has
repeatedly considered a number of factors[:] ... whether the group's defining
characteristic is immutable,] ... whether the group has suffered a history of
discrimination.... "or [ifthe group has been] relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process."
Id (citations omitted) (quoting SanAntonio Indep. Sch. Dist v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)
(emphasis omitted) (third alteration in original)).
76.Id. at 436.
77. See id. at 437.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 437-39.
80.Seeid. at 438.
81. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that laws criminalizing homosexual sodomy did not run
afoul of the Due Process Clause because there is no fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy).
82. SeeEquality Found., 860 F. Supp. at 439.
83.Id. at 440.
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bisexuals constitute a quasi-suspect class and, therefore, Issue 3 must meet
intermediate scrutiny to be constitutional.84
In its dealing with the equal protection claim, the district court held that Issue 3
did not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. The court rebutted
the City's argument that Issue 3 advanced the state interests of saving resources and
minimizing government regulation by stating that any money saved by the
elimination of laws prohibiting discrimination against homosexuals "would be, at
best, de minimis." 3 The court rebutted the argument that Issue 3 would serve the
government interest of preserving the nuclear family by explaining that such an
interest is not sufficiently related to Issue 3's broad and prospective ban on all laws
forbidding discrimination against homosexuals.86 More importantly, however, the
court held that "the very structure of Issue 3"-its sweeping scope and its
prospective ban on all anti-discrimination legislation, policies, or regulations on
behalf of homosexuals-infers that its passage was a result of a "'bare... desire
to harm a politically unpopular group . . .' [and s]uch an objective can never
'constitute a legitimate governmental interest."' 8 7 The court went even further,
stating that "[t]he purpose not only to permit discrimination, but also to encourage
it, [is] constitutionally defective." 8
Because the district court declared Issue 3 unconstitutional under the most
deferential standard of rational basis review, the district court ruled, a fortiori, that
Issue 3 did not meet the intermediate level of scrutiny demanded by its classification
as a quasi-suspect class, nor the strict scrutiny level demanded by Issue 3's
infingement upon homosexuals' fundamental right to equal access to the political
process."
Despite the district court's invalidation of Issue 3 on the equal protection claim,
the court went further and declared that Issue 3 violated homosexuals' First
Amendment right to free speech and association.9" Moreover, the court held that
Issue 3 was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 9'
2. The Sixth Circuit
True to the spirit of the struggle, the proponents of Issue 3 were not going to let
the district court have the last word. Accordingly, the district court's decision was
appealed by ERNSR and the City to the Sixth Circuit United States Court of
84. See id.
85. Id. at 441 (emphasis omitted).
86. See id. at 442.
87. IaL at443 (citation omitted) (quoting United States Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528,534 (1973) (omissions in original) (emphasis omitted)).
88.Id.
89. See id. at 449.
90. See id. at 444.
91. See ia at 449. Because the focus here is the Sixth Circuit's decision in light of Romer, and
because the Court inRomer did not address First Amendment issues or questions of vagueness,
these holdings, although significant, are not relevant to the scope of this Note.
[Vol. 74:9911000
"DISTINCTIONS WITHO UT A DIFFERENCE"
Appeals. On appeal, the judgment of the district court was reversed and the
permanent injunction vacated.'
The Sixth Circuit began its review of the district court's ruling by disregarding
the findings of fact made by the lower court. Stating that because the lower court's
findings of fact constituted "ultimate facts and interrelated applications of law,
sociological judgments, mixed questions of law and fact, and/or findings designed
to support 'constitutional facts,"' the Sixth Circuit held that such findings of fact
were subject to de novo review.93 Once freed from the novel findings of fact, the
Sixth Circuit made quick work of the district court's ruling. It ruled that Issue 3
violated neither the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, nor the Due
Process Clause.94
In addressing the equal protection claim, the Sixth Circuit first dealt with the
issue of whether or not homosexuals constitute a quasi-suspect class. In doing so,
the Sixth Circuit held that the district court misconstrued Bowers by holding that
homosexuals constituted a quasi-suspect class.95 It reasoned that even, assuming
arguendo, sexual orientation is a separate characteristic beyond the control of the
individual, homosexuals cannot comprise an identifiable class because "'they do not
[necessarily] exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that
define them as a discrete group. '96 The court opined that persons affected by
legislation concerning sexual orientation are so affected because of their conduct
which identifies them as homosexual, not because of their sexual orientation.97
Hence, the Sixth Circuit held that Bowers commands, as a matter of law, that
homosexuals cannot comprise a quasi-suspect class, and thus, the district court's
holding to the contrary was erroneous.9S
Next, the Sixth Circuit asserted that the lower court's recognition of a
fundamental right to equal participation in the political process was "erroneously
fashioned." '99 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that none of the cases relied
upon by the lower court supported the recognition of a fundamental right to equal
participation in the political process."' 0 Therefore, the circuit court held that
because Issue 3 only has the effect of rendering futile the lobbying of the City
Council for legislation preferential to homosexuals, and because homosexuals may
still seek relief via the Ohio Legislature or the United States Congress, opponents
of Issue 3 simply lost a battle in a political dispute, not a fundamental constitutional
right.101
After concluding that homosexuals do not constitute a quasi-suspect class and
that Issue 3 impinged on no fundamental right, the Sixth Circuit held that Issue 3
92.See Equality Found. ofGreater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261,271 (6th
Cir. 1995) (Equality Foundation 1), vacated, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996).
93. Id. at 265.
94. See id. passim.
95. See id. at 268.
96.Id at267 (quoting Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587,602 (1987) (alteration in original)).
97. See id.
98. See id. at 268.
99.Id.
100. See id. at 268-69.
101. See id. at 269.
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was subject to and passed the rational basis test." In ruling as such, the court found
that Issue 3 furthered a "litany of valid community interests."" 3 Specifically, the
court found that Issue 3
enhanced associational liberty on the part of Cincinnati residents[,] ... return[ed]
the municipal government to a position of neutrality on the issue[,] ... reduced
governmental regulation of the private social and economic conduct of
Cincinnati residents .... [and] decreased municipal supervision of private
conduct, which necessarily may result in some cost savings for the City's
taxpayers.1
4
As a result, the Sixth Circuit held that Issue 3 did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution.' 05
3. The U.S. Supreme Court
Equality Foundation appealed the Sixth Circuit's decision to the United States
Supreme Court. Yet, prior to the Sixth Circuit's decision in Equality Foundation
1, the Supreme Court had already granted certiorari to Romer v. Evans. Therefore,
when it granted the petition for writ of certiorari, the Court vacated the Sixth
Circuit's judgment and remanded the case back to the Sixth Circuit "for further
consideration in light of Romer v. Evans."'"
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, dissented
to the Court's decision to grant certiorari and remand. Justice Scalia wrote that
Issue 3 involves a decision at the "lowest electoral subunit" to deprive homosexuals
of "special protection."'" 7 Therefore, Justice Scalia scorned, "the consequence of
holding this provision unconstitutional would be that nowhere in the country may
the people decide, in democratic fashion, not to accord special protection to
homosexuals."0 8 Finally, Justice Scalia characterized the issue in the Equality
Foundation cases as an "ultra-Romer issue"-an issue not embraced by Romer."9
On the other hand, the majority of the Court apparently felt that the issue in
Equality Foundation was embraced within Romer and therefore, commanded the
Sixth Circuit to decide the remanded case consistent with the "light" of Romer."'
102. See id. at 268.
103. Id. at 270.
104. Id.
105. See id at270-71. The court also held that Issue 3 did not violate the FirstAmendment nor
was it unconstitutionally vague; however, for reasons previously mentioned, the analysis on these
issues is not pertinent to the scope of this Note. See supra note 91.
106. Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 518 U.S. 1001, 1001
(1996).
107. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108. Id. (emphasis omitted).
109. Id. (emphasis in original).
110. See id. Although the fact that the majority of the Supreme Court did not agree with the
views ofthe dissent, the Sixth Circuit panel still attempted to distinguish Romer on grounds based
upon the rationale of the dissent. Thus, the Sixth Circuit's use of the dissent's rationale appears
misguided. See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, Nos. 94-3855,
94-3973, 94-4280, 1998 WL 101701, at *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 5, 1998).
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4. The Sixth Circuit-Again
Upon remand, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its decision in Equality Foundation
I despite the Supreme Court's decision inRomer. The court began by noting that
Romer did not hold Amendment 2 unconstitutional under strict scrutiny or
intermediate scrutiny because the Romer Court did not address the issues of
whether a fundamental constitutional right to equal participation in the political
process existed or whether homosexuals constitute a quasi-suspect class."1' The
Sixth Circuit explained that instead, the Court in Romer had reconfirmed the
traditional equal protection review of legislative enactments and had ultimately
applied the rational basis test to Amendment 2.112
Next, the Sixth Circuit tried to distinguish Issue 3 from Amendment 2. The court
stated, "the two cases involved substantially different enactments of entirely distinct
scope and impact, which conceptually and analytically distinguished the
constitutional posture of the two measures."' It further stated that the "salient
operative factors which motivated the Romer analysis and result were unique to that
case and were not implicated in Equality Foundation L""' In other words, the
Sixth Circuit agreed with Justice Scalia's dissent to the Court's remanding of
Equality Foundation L In the end, the Sixth Circuit distinguished Amendment 2
and upheld Issue 3 based on the fact that Issue 3 applied to the city charter of
Cincinnati, while Amendment 2 applied to the Colorado state constitution." 5
After the Sixth Circuit handed down its decision upholding Issue 3, Equality
Foundation petitioned the Sixth Circuit for a rehearing en banc." 6 "The panel...
reviewed the petition for rehearing and conclude[d] that the issues raised in the
petition were fully considered upon the original submission and decision of the
case. Accordingly, the petition [was] denied.""'
In concurring with the denial of the suggestion for rehearing en banc, Judge
Boggs asserted that "Romer said nothing about whether a city like Cincinnati could
choose to foreclose the enactment of possibly salutary, but also possibly insidious,
gay-rights ordinances."" 8 Judge Boggs emphasized the different character a city has
as compared to a "constitutionally cognizable political sovereignt[y]," that is, a
state."" Therefore, Boggs opined that "Issue 3 merely reflects the kind of social and
political experimentation that is such a common characteristic of city
government."'2 0 Finally, Boggs put forth that only a rational reason for Cincinnati
voters to have approved Issue 3 need be contemplated to sustain Issue 3's
111. See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289,294
(6th Cir. 1997) (Equality Foundation fl), cert denied, 119 S. Ct 365 (1998).
112. See id.
113. Id. at 295.
114.Id.
115. See id. at 296-301.
116. SeeEquality Found., 1998 WL 101701, at *1.
117.Id.
118. Id. (Boggs, J., concurring).
119.Id.
120. Id. at *2.
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constitutionality, and therefore proceeded to give examples of voters' possible
rational reasons for approving the city charter.'
However, six Sixth Circuit judges, including Chief Judge Martin, dissented to the
denial of the petition for rehearing en bane: "we believe that the panel's opinion...
conflicts with the Supreme Court's decision in [Romer]."'2  The dissent argued that
the panel's distinctions of Issue 3 from Amendment 2 were initially suspect because
they were based upon Justice Scalia's dissent in the decision to remand Equality
Foundation, and that those distinctions "appear to be either refuted by the facts or
the principle of law announced in Romer."'23 In the end, the dissent stated:
We believe the panel decision in this case draws "distinctions without a
difference" and fails to abide by the key ruling in Romer that "[a] law declaring
that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all
others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the
laws in the most literal sense." 1"
5. The U.S. Supreme Court-Again
Finally, Equality Foundation II was appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari. 5 Although
some news reporters stated that the Supreme Court had upheld the Sixth Circuit's
decision,12 no national precedent was set by the Court's denial of certiorari.
Moreover, in a somewhat unusual step, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter
and Ginsburg, delivered an opinion respecting the denial of the petition of the writ
of certiorari. Stevens re-emphasized that a denial of certiorari "is not a ruling on the
merits.' 27 Such a denial of certiorari "reflects nothing more than a conclusion that
a particular case may not constitute an appropriate forum in which to decide a
significant issue.""1 Concluding, Justice Stevens stated, "The Court's action today
should not be interpreted either as an independent construction of the charter or as
an expression of its views about the underlying issues that the parties have debated
at length."' '29 In other words, the constitutionality of city charters like Cincinnati's
is not resolved.13
121. See id. at *2-3.
122. Id. at *3 (Gilman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane).
123. Id. at *4.
124. Id. at *5 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
125. See Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 119 S. Ct 365
(1998).
126. See Richard Carelli, High Court Upholds City's Gay-Protection Ban, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Oct 14, 1998, at AS.
127.Equali4'Found, 119 S. Ct at365; see also Brown v. Texas, 118 S. Ct 355,356 (1997);
Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045,1047 (1995); Barber v. Tennessee, 513 U.S. 1184, 1184 (1995).
128.Equality Found., 119 S. Ct. at 365.
129.Id. at 366.
130. ThisNotevwas written well before the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Accordingly, this
Note does not primarily address the Supreme Court's action regarding EqualityFoundation 1.
Instead, this Note concentrates upon the Sixth Circuit's ruling in light of Romer.
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Thus, the Sixth Circuit's ruling in Equality Foundation II, the subsequent denial
of the petition for rehearing en bane, and the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari
set the stage for the argument herein; the crux of which asserts that the Sixth
Circuit's attempt to distinguish Issue 3 from Amendment 2 failed. As a result, the
Equality Foundation II decision stands as a contradiction and misreading of the
majority opinion in Romer."'
III. How EgUALrrYFOUNDATIONMISCONSTRUED ROMER
The Sixth Circuit misconstrued Romer v. Evans on two somewhat overlapping
grounds. First, the Court in Romer did not employ any traditional equal protection
level of scrutiny; but instead, the Court identified Amendment 2 as a per se
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.' The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand,
failed to identify Issue 3 as a per se violation. Second, despite recognizing
Amendment 2 as a per se violation of equal protection, the Court in Romer further
held that Amendment 2 violated the rational basis test as well. In doing so,
however, the Court employed a heightened form of the rational basis test, which
some commentators have coined "legitimacy review."133 In contradiction, the
Equality Foundation II court applied the traditional rational basis standard and
determined that Issue 3 was not violative of the Equal Protection Clause. In
distinguishing the two cases, the Sixth Circuit argued that Issue 3 did not have a
similar scope of impact, was not predicated on animosity towards any particular
group, and did nothing more than invalidate and prohibit the granting of special
rights to gays and lesbians. As elucidated below, no material distinction was
ultimately made by the Sixth Circuit to warrant the upholding of Issue 3 in light of
Romer.
A. Per Se Invalidity and the Scope of Impact
Many commentators view the Romer decision as a declaration that Amendment
2-type statutes are so invidiously discriminatory that they constitute a per se
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 4 Illustratively, the Romer majority
opined, "the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an exceptional and ... invalid
form of legislation."' 13 The Court further stated, "Central both to the idea of the rule
of law and to our own Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the principle
that government and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who
seek its assistance."' 36 From these statements Joseph S. Jackson concluded that:
131. Because of the ambiguous nature of the Romer majority opinion, the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Equality Foundation H may not be characterized as entirely deceitful.
132. See Joseph S. Jackson, Persons of Equal Worth: Romer v. Evans and the Politics of
EqualProtection, 45 UCLAL. REV. 453,464-65 (1997).
133. Todd M. HughesMaking Romer Work, 33 CAL. W. L. REv. 169,176 (1997).
134. See Jackson, supra note 132, at 465 n.61.
135. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,632 (1996).
136. Id. at 633 (emphasis added).
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[T]he Court seems to say [that Amendment 2] is a per se denial of equal
protection: a law providing "in general" that one group of citizens must
surmount greater barriers than others to obtain aid from the government "is itself "
a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense." 7
Another commentator proposed that "the [J]ustices in the [Romer] majority
appear to have been influenced by the argument offered by five prominent
constitutional law professors who filed a brief amicus curiae," and argued that
"Amendment 2 amounted to a per se violation of the Equal Protection Clause, one
so literal as to require no inquiry into the applicable level of scrutiny."' 38 The
amicus brief argued that:
To decree that some identifying feature or characteristic of a person or group
may not be invoked as the basis of any claim of discrimination under any law or
regulation enacted, previously or in the future, by the state, its agencies, or its
localities-when persons and groups not sharing this characteristic are not
similarly handicapped-is, by definition, to deny the "equal protection of the
laws" to persons having that characteristic.13
The amicus brief contended that this is exactly what was done in Amendment 2140
and this Note argues that this is also exactly what was done in Issue 3.
The Equality Foundation II court neglected to recognize Issue 3 as constituting
a per se denial of equal protection because it concluded that the scope of impact of
Issue 3 was "conceptually and analytically" distinguishable from that of Amendment
2.' 4' The court grounded this distinction on the fact that Amendment 2 applied
statewide whereas Issue 3 was limited to local city legislation and thus local in
scope. 4 2 Consequently, the court reasoned that Issue 3 did not present the same
constitutional problem as Amendment 2 because opponents of a "strictly local
enactment need not undertake the monumental political task of procuring an
amendment to the Ohio Constitution."'43 Instead, the court reasoned, such
opponents could pursue relief from a higher level of Ohio government.
44
Furthermore, the court insisted that Issue 3 deprived homosexuals only of special
rights, not equal rights, and thus, was distinguishable from Amendment 2."1
4
However, the scope of impact of Issue 3 was materially similar to the scope of
impact of Amendment 2, which the Court in Romer found so repugnant. Moreover,
the "special rights" argument advanced in Equality Foundation II appears
analogous to the "special rights" argument put forth in Romer, which the Supreme
Court emphatically rejected. Simply stated, the Sixth Circuit failed to materially
137. Jackson, supra note 132, at 465 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633).
138. Schacter, supra note 30, at 378.
139. Brief of Laurence H. Tribe, John Hart Ely, Gerald Gunther, Philip B. Kurland, and
Kathleen M. Sullivan, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3-4,Romer (No. 94-1039)
[hereinafter Amicus Brief] (emphasis added).
140. See id.
141. EqualityFound. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289,295 (6th
Cir. 1997), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998).
142. See id. at 296-301.
143. Id. at 297.
144. See id. at 301.
145. See id. at 296-98.
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distinguish Issue 3 from Amendment 2 by not recognizing Issue 3 as a per se
violation of equal protection.
The Court in Romer explained why Amendment 2 defies the traditional equal
protection conventional inquiry stating, "First, the amendment has the peculiar
property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named
group ... [and s]econd, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons
offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward
the class that it affects."'" With regard to the first explanation, the Court's concern
with the scope of Amendment 2 was twofold. First, the Court was concerned with
the "horizontal" impact that Amendment 2 has on the "substantive, or first-order,
interests;"" 7 and second, the Court was concerned with the "vertical" impact that
Amendment 2 has on the "political, or second-order, rights of Colorado's
citizens."1 Each concern represents a significant reason for the Court's
invalidation of Amendment 2 as a per se violation of equal protection. 4 9 In contrast,
the court in Equality Foundation H distinguished Amendment 2 from Issue 3 based
primarily on the vertical scope of impact, and failed to materially distinguish the
two anti-gay rights initiatives based on the horizontal scope of impact.5 ' Although
it is unclear which component was more relevant, the Romer Court was certainly
concerned with both the horizontal impact of Amendment 2 as well as the vertical
impacts.' 5'
Particularly, the Romer Court looked to the fact that Amendment 2 operated to
repeal and forbid public-accommodation laws that had been enacted throughout the
state to protect homosexuals from discrimination, as well as the fact that
Amendment 2 operated to nullify "specific legal protections for this targeted class
in all transactions in housing, sale of real estate, insurance, health and welfare
services, private education, and employment."'5 2 Furthermore, the Court declared
that it could be inferred from the sweeping language of Amendment 2 that it
"deprives gays and lesbians even of the protection of general laws and policies that
prohibit arbitrary discrimination in governmental and private settings."'5 Hence,
to effectively distinguish Issue 3 from Amendment 2, a court must distinguish the
146. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
147. Dillot supra note 25, at 374.
148. Id. ("At this point, it is useful to conceptualize Amendment 2 as having horizontal and
vertical components?); cf Craig Cassin Burke, Note, Fencing OutPolitially Unpopular Groups
from the NormalPolitical Processes: The Equal Protection Concerns of ColoradoAmendment
Two, 69 IND. LJ. 275,287-88 (1993) ("[T]he arm of equal protection... has essentially two axes
of application: a horizontal axis, which mandates equality in state action in all branches of
government, and a vertical axis, which governs the method by which decision-making power may
be allocated along the governmental hierarchy.") (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CoNsTrrrmoNAL LAw §§ 16-17 (2d ed. 1988)) (footnotes omitted).
149.But cf Dillof, supra note 25, at 375 ("It is not clear, however, which component is more
relevant to the Court's view thatAmendment 2 was so unusual as to defy conventional analysis.").
150. See id. at 374.
151. The Court exclaimed, "The resulting disqualification of a class of persons from the right
to seek specific protection from the law is unprecedented in ourjurisprudence." Romer, 517 U.S.
at 633.
152. Id. at 629.
153.Id.
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respective scopes of impact on both equal protection axes. However, the Sixth
Circuit failed to make such material constitutional distinctions.
1. Horizontal Impact
Issue 3 operates to have the same horizontal (substantive) impact upon the rights
of gays and lesbians in Cincinnati as Amendment 2 had upon citizens of Colorado.
For example, Issue 3 was drafted in response to two ordinances adopted by the
Cincinnati City Council which protected gays and lesbians from discrimination in
the public and private sphere.'54 The first ordinance mandated that the City could
not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in its hiring practices. 5' The
second ordinance barred "private discrimination in employment, housing, or public
accommodation for reasons of sexual orientation."' '56 Thus, in comparing
Amendment 2 with Issue 3, these horizontal impacts, such as employment, housing,
and public accommodation, affect homosexuals in their respective localities equally.
One of Colorado's main arguments for sustaining Amendment 2 was that such
measures do no more than deny homosexuals special rights. 57 In fact, this argument
has been the "signature slogan of the organized opposition to gay civil rights for the
last several years."' However, the Romer Court declined to accept the view that
Amendment 2 did nothing more than deprive homosexuals of special rights."9
Emphatically, the Supreme Court in Romer rejected this argument stating, "We find
nothing special in the protections Amendment 2 withholds;" moreover, "[t]hese are
protections taken for granted by most people either because they already have them
or do not need them."'" The Sixth Circuit recognized that the Romer Court asserted
that Amendment 2 could be construed to deprive homosexuals of all state law
protections which other people take for granted. 6 1 However, as the Sixth Circuit
also recognized, Romer "did not rely upon that potential universally exclusive effect
to invalidate the measure, -but instead ultimately construed Colorado Amendment
2 only to remove and prohibit special legal rights for homosexuals under state
law."
, 162
154. See Equality Found. of Greater.Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnafi, 128 F.3d 289,291-92
(6th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 119 S. Ct 365 (1998).
155. See id.
156. Id. at 292.
157. SeeRomer, 517 U.S. at 626; see also Schacter, supra note 30, at 381; GaryAlan Collis,
Note, Romer v. Evans: Gay Americans Find Shelter After Stormy Legal Odyssey, 24 PEPP. L.
Rnv. 991, 1035 (1997).
158. Schacter, supra note 30, at 381.
159. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
160. Id.
161. See Equality Found., 128 F.3d at296.
"Amendment 2's reach may not be limited to specific laws passed for the benefit
of gays and lesbians. It is a fair, if not necessary, inference from the broad language
ofthe amendment that it deprives gays and lesbians even of the protection of general
laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in governmental and private
settings."
Id. (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 630).
162. Id. at 295.
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Yet, because of Romer's language that the Court found "nothing special inthe
protections Amendment 2 withholds,"' 63 the Equality Foundation 1I court opined
that the true constitutional deficiency in Amendment 2 was the possibility that it
could be read to deprive homosexuals of the general protections afforded to all of
the citizens of Colorado. 64 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit found .Issue 3
distinguishable from Amendment 2 because it construed Issue 3 to only deprive
homosexuals of special rights.'65
Here the Sixth Circuit's distinction broke down for two reasons. First, the
Supreme Court expressly stated that it did not decide Romer on such a possibility
that Amendment 2 may be read as to withhold protection from homosexuals
provided by statutes of general application: "If this consequence [(the deprivation
ofprotection from state laws of general applicability)] follows from Amendment 2,
as its broad language suggests, it would compound the constitutional difficulties the
law creates. The state court did not decide whether the amendment has this effect,
however, and neither need we.""' Second, the Sixth Circuit's argument thatIssue
3 only deprives homosexuals of special rights ultimately fails. True, Issue 3 states:
"No special class status may be granted based upon sexual orientation, conduct or
relationships;"'67 thus, the Sixth Circuit's distinction seemed initially plausible.
However, the Sixth Circuit analogized special privileges and preferences to the
"legally sanctioned power to force employers, landlords, and merchants to transact
business with them."'68 The Romer Court, on the other hand, did not view such as
a special right. Instead, the Court found nothing special about protections against
the exclusion from "endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society." 69
Although one can see how a court may become confused following Romer's foggy
light, the Sixth Circuit failed to make a distinction which makes a constitutional
difference between the horizontal harms effectuated by Amendment 2 and those
harms effectuated by Issue 3. Not only did the Sixth Circuit fail to distinguish the
horizontal harms, but it also failed to materially distinguish the vertical harms
created by Issue 3 from the vertical harms created by Amendment 2.
2. Vertical Harms
The court in Equality Foundation II focused primarily on the "vertical"
(political) scope of impact that Issue 3 would have upon the political rights of gays
and lesbians. It reasoned that what the Supreme Court considered so extraordinary
about Amendment 2 was the fact that its scope was statewide. The Sixth Circuit
reasoned:
163. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
164. Equality Found., 128 F.3d at 296.
165. See id. at 297.
166. Romer, 517 U.S. at 630; see also Equality Found, of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of
Cincinnati, Nos. 94-3855, 94-3793, 94-4280, 1998 WL 101701, at *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 5, 1998)
(Gilman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane).
167. Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261,264 (6th
Cir. 1995) (emphasis added), vacated, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996).
168. EqualityFound., 128 F.3d at 296.
169. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
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The low level ofgovernment at which [Issue 3] becomes operative is significant
because the opponents of that strictly local enactment need not undertake the
monumental political task of procuring an amendment to the Ohio Constitution
as a precondition to achievement of a desired change in the local law, but instead
may either seek local repeal of the subject amendment through ordinary
municipal political processes, or pursue relief from every higher level of Ohio
government including but not limited to Hamilton County, state agencies, the
Ohio legislature, or the voters themselves via a statewide initiative.17
The Sixth Circuit was correct to conclude that the vertical scope of impact of
Amendment 2 was more sweeping than Issue 3. The Sixth Circuit was wrong,
however, to conclude that that difference amounts to a constitutional distinction.
The burden Issue 3 places upon the political rights of gays and lesbians in
Cincinnati is materially analogous to the burden Amendment 2 produced so as to
warrant it a per se invalidation of equal protection.
For example, the Romer Court acknowledged that "[ilt is not within our
constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort."17" ' The unusual character of
Amendment 2 and Issue 3 was that they both singled out a particular class of
citizens and made it more difficult for that group to acquire aid, protections, or
advantages from the government relative to the rest of the populace. Just as
Amendment 2 rendered a particular class of persons "in Colorado completely
ineligible for the protection of its laws from an entire category of mistreatment," 72
so too, "Issue 3 completely cuts-off gay[s], lesbians and bisexuals [in Cincinnati]
from the normal and accessible avenues of political action and political
participation, and requires them to seek a charter amendment any time they want
or require any rule, regulation, ordinances or policy on their behalf"173
Logically, there exists no less a facial violation of the Equal Protection Clause to
require gays and lesbians in Cincinnati to seek an amendment to the city charter in
order to receive city government laws in their favor, than there exists to require
gays and lesbians in Colorado to seek an amendment to the state constitution. In
both instances, the "normal political process" has been removed -from gay and
lesbian citizens, and in its place is substituted a political process which is "more
complex, costly and burdensome."' 74 One constitutional law professor was quoted
as calling the Sixth Circuit's distinction "indefensible.'17 He was further quoted
as stating that "[b]oth measures allow every group access to the political process
except gays and lesbians." 76
Again, the Sixth Circuit rightly recognized that a group could more easily seek
the repeal of a city charter amendment as opposed to a state constitutional
170. Equality Found., 128 F.3d at 297.
171. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
172. Amicus Brief, supra note 139, at 4.
173. Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417,429
(S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd and vacated, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 518 U.S. 1001
(1996).
174. Id.
175. Kelly McMury, CincinnatiAntigay Measure Upheld by Sixth Circuit, TRIAL, Apr. 1998,
at 105, 105 (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky, Professor of Law, University of Southern California,
Los Angeles).
176. Id.
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amendment. The court stated that opponents to the local enactment could "seek
local repeal of the subject amendment through the ordinary municipal political
processes ." 77 However, given the fact that the Supreme Court in Romer declined
to base its holding on its precedents involving discriminatory political
restructuring, 7 1 the Sixth Circuit's distinction is unpersuasive. As the dissent to the
denial of the petition for rehearing in Equality Foundation II stated, "the fact that
it is easier for a group to seek the repeal of a city charter amendment as opposed to
a state constitutional amendment is of no consequence as far as the essential
rationale of Romer is concerned."' 79 The dissent further asserted that because
Romer was decided on equal protection grounds, which apply to local and state
governmental action, "the fact that Issue Three is a local as opposed to a state
measure is of no controlling significance for purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause."' 0 Hence, the fact that Issue 3 applies only to a city charter while
Amendment 2 applies to a state constitution makes no constitutional distinction. It
is a distinction without a difference.
In sum, the Sixth Circuit's attempt to distinguish Issue 3 from Amendment 2
based on their respective scopes of impact falls short. While the Supreme Court in
Romer focused upon the "horizontal" and "vertical" scope of impacts that
Amendment 2 would have upon gay and lesbian rights, the Sixth Circuit
emphasized strongly the distinction in the "vertical" political impact. In doing so,
the Sixth Circuit incorrectly concluded that Issue 3 represented less of an equal
protection problem than Amendment 2 because Issue 3 operated only at the city and
not the state level. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit failed to materially distinguish the
"horizontal" harms created by the anti-gay initiatives as well. Hence, the Sixth
Circuit declined to follow the command of Romer and failed to distinguish the two
anti-gay initiatives on the basis of scope of impact.
B. Traditional Rational Basis Review?
After determining that Amendment 2's overly broad scope of impact based on
both horizontal and vertical harms constituted a bare desire to harm homosexuals
as a group, and thus constituted a per se violation of equal protection, the Romer
Court concluded that "in addition to the far-reaching deficiencies of Amendment 2
that we have noted, the principles it offends, in another sense, are conventional and
venerable; a law must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental
purpose, and Amendment 2 does not."'' However, the Court's use of the rational
177. EqualityFound. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289,297 (6th
Cir. 1997), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998).
178. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 625-26 (1996) (stating that the Colorado Supreme
Court had relied on such cases, but affirming the court's decision on different rationale).
179. Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, Nos. 94-3855, 94-3973,
94-4280, 1998 WL 101701, at *5 (6th Cir. Feb. 5, 1998) (Gilman, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en bane).
180. Id.; see also City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,448 (1985)
(stating that "the electorate as a whole, whether by referendum or otherwise, could not order city
action violative of the Equal Protection Clause").
181. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 (citations omitted).
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basis test to invalidate Amendment 2 defied the conventional understanding of
rational basis scrutiny. Before examining what level of scrutiny the Court employed
in Romer, some light must be shed on the traditional tripartite equal protection
analysis developed by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court has established three levels of equal protection review."s
First, strict scrutiny, the highest level of review, will be applied if a law makes a
classification which "impinge[s] on personal rights protected by the Constitution"'
or targets a suspect class.' Laws which are subjected to strict scrutiny "will be
sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest."' 85
Second, intermediate scrutiny is applied to laws which classify on the basis of sex
or illegitimacy. 8" Such a classification "fails unless it is substantially related to a
sufficiently important governmental interest."' 87 Finally, the lowest level of scrutiny
is the traditional rational basis test. If a law neither infringes upon a fundamental
constitutional right nor classifies on the basis of a suspect or quasi-suspect group,
then "[tihe general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest"o ss The Supreme Court has warned that the rational basis
test is not a "license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative
choices." 89 Still, the Supreme Court has declared that such a statute will pass
constitutional muster as long as there exists "any reasonably conceivable state of
facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification."' 90 Although it is
unclear, the Court inRomer seemed to apply some level of scrutiny higher than the
traditional rational basis review.
1. "Legitimacy Review"
The Romer Court did not scrutinize whether or not gays and lesbians constitute
a suspect or quasi-suspect class, but instead, presumed that the rational basis test
would be employed. 9' However, some commentators have recognized that the
182. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41.
183. Id. at 440.
184. See Wiliam M. Wilson Ia Note, Romer v. Evans: "Terminal Silliness," or Enlightened
Jurisprudence?, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1891, 1894 (1997).
Suspect classes are those classes whose members historically have "been subjected
to discrimination," "exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics,"
and are "a minority or politically powerless." Additionally, members of suspect
classes exhibit identiffying characteristics that are beyond their control and experience
discrimination for characteristics that are "not truly indicative of their abilities."
Ia (footnotes omitted) (quoting Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986), and Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,313 (1976)).
185. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
186. See id. at 440-41. Groups afforded intermediate level scrutiny are commonly referred to
as quasi-suspect classes. See, e.g,Murgia, 427 U.S. at 325 (per curiam) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
187. Cleburne, 473 US. at 441.
188. Id. at 440.
189. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,313 (1993).
190. Id.
191. See Hughes, supra note 133, at 175.
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Romer Court did not use the traditional rational basis test, but instead, applied some
form of heightened rational basis review." One commentator has called this form
of heightened rational basis review "legitimacy review."'93 Under traditional
rational basis review the Court has been satisfied that a statute is constitutional as
long as any reasonably conceivable state of facts provided the government with a
rational basis for the statute. Because Colorado advanced many reasons for
Amendment 2 which normally would have passed the highly deferential traditional
rational basis test, Romer, therefore, "demanded not only some rational basis but
that the basis bear a 'rational relation to some legitimate end."" 94 The Court in
applying "legitimacy review" concluded that Amendment 2 bore no relation to any
legitimate end.195 More importantly, the Court held that Amendment 2 was itself an
illegitimate end. For example, the Court stated, "It is a status-based enactment
divorced from any factual context from which we could discern a relationship to
legitimate state interests; it is a classification of persons undertaken for its own
sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit." 96 Thus, the Romer
Court demanded something more than just any conceivable rational basis for the
enactment Yet, Romer was not the first case in which the Court had used some type
of heightened rational basis test.
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., the Court held that although
the mentally retarded do not constitute a quasi-suspect class, a state "may not rely
on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to
render the distinction arbitrary or irrational." 97 Although the city advanced
seemingly rational reasons for its requirement of a special use permit for a group
home for the mentally retarded (such as the fear of decreased property values and
several safety concerns), the Court was able to see through the proffered state
interests and recognize them as resting upon fears and negative attitudes against the
mentally retarded.'
Similarly, the Court in Romer saw through the state interests advanced by
Colorado recognizing them as resting upon irrationality and animus towards gays
and lesbians. The Court stated that "laws of the kind now before us raise the
inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the
class of persons affected."' 99 The Romer Court asserted that Amendment 2's
general, broad denial of protections from the law to homosexuals "inflicts on them
immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie any legitimate
justifications that may be claimed for it."2"' In other words, where the harm is so
broad and diffuse, the Court will presume the malign motive to harm that particular
192. See id at 175-76; Dillof supra note 25, at 379 (arguing that some higher level of scrutiny
than traditional rational basis was employed by the Court).
193. Hughes, supra note 133, at 176.
194. Id. at 175 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996)).
195. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 ("We cannot say that Amendment 2 is directed to any
identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective.").
196.Id.
197.473 U.S. 432,446 (1985).
198. See id. at 450.
199. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (emphasis added).
200. Id. at 635.
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group: "The breadth of the Amendment is so far removed from these particular
justifications that we find it impossible to credit them." ''
Hence, the Court made clear that the Equal Protection Clause will not tolerate
enactments solely motivated by animus towards homosexuals." 2 And in doing so,
the Court relied on well-settled doctrine.0 3 Yet, the Sixth Circuit deviated from
Romer and this well-settled doctrine in concluding that Issue 3 passed rational basis
scrutiny.
2. The Sixth Circuit's Rational Basis Analysis
As stated above, under a traditional rational basis review, a court should uphold
the law in question if merely any possible legitimate motive can be recognized by
the court. Instead, in Romer the Court did not accept any possible legitimate basis
for Amendment 2 because of its unusually broad and harmful effect. Because the
Court in Romer seemingly applied some level of review above the traditional
rational basis test, but continued to speak in terms of rational basis, one can
understand the Sixth Circuit's confusion. Amidst the confusion, the Sixth Circuit
failed to pick up on the heightened form of review employed in Romer, and
therefore, ultimately misread Romer's holding.
The Sixth Circuit's rational basis analysis in Equality Foundation I1 contradicts
the Court's rational basis analysis inRomer on two grounds. First, the Sixth Circuit
applied the traditional rational basis review to Issue 3 instead of the heightened
rational basis review applied in Romer. Second, the Sixth Circuit court concluded
that Issue 3's enactment was not motivated by animosity towards gays and lesbians,
and therefore, the court declared that the state interests put forth by the city passed
equal protection scrutiny. In other words, the Sixth Circuit failed to follow the
rational basis analysis performed in Romer.
The Equality Foundation II court began its re-analysis of Issue 3 by erroneously
concluding that Romer had used the traditional rational basis test to evaluate laws
which "uniquely burdened the interests of homosexuals.""2 In other words, the
Sixth Circuit took the position that as long as Issue 3 advanced any conceivable
state interest, it should be upheld. Under such an analysis, the Equality Foundation
1I court recognized two state interests advanced by Issue 3 which were sufficient
to pass the traditional rational basis test.2 5
First, the court concluded that Issue 3's withdrawal of gays and lesbians from the
protected persons category under pre-existing anti-discrimination ordinances, as
well as its preclusion of such persons from protection in any future anti-
201. Id.
202. One commentator has argued that the Court keats the "absence of a rational basis for
Amendment 2, and the existence of animus toward gays and lesbians, as two sides of the same
coin." Jackson, supra note 132, at 495.
203. See United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (holding
unconstitutional an enactment which was motivated by a "bare... desire to harm a politically
unpopular group"); see also Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447 (citing Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
204. Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289,294 (6th
Cir. 1997), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998).
205. Id. at 300.
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discrimination ordinances, "would eliminate and forestall the substantial public
costs that accrue from the investigation and adjudication of sexual orientation
discrimination complaints."" 6 Second, the court concluded that Issue 3 would
reduce the city residents' litigation costs by eliminating a municipally created class
of legal claims." ' Thus, the court held that Issue 3 passed the traditional rational
basis review and was, therefore, distinguishable from Romer.
However, the equal protection analysis in Romer concentrated on the legitimate
ends, not merely whether any conceivable reason to justify the enactment existed."'
For example, the Romer Court also considered Colorado's interest in conserving
funds, but disregarded such ajustification because the wide breadth of Amendment
2 was too far removed from such a justification." 9 The Court opined that the
breadth and limitless sweep of Amendment 2 gave rise to the "inevitable inference"
that it was enacted out of animosity and moral disregard for gays and lesbians.210 As
a result, because the Court recognized that the so called "legitimate end"2 ' of
Amendment 2 was born out of animosity toward homosexuals, Amendment 2 failed
the Court's "legitimacy review."
In contradistinction, the Equality Foundation II court declared that the passage
of Issue 3 was not motivated by animosity for gays and lesbians because Issue 3
constituted only local legislation which does not have the extreme scope and effect
that Amendment 2 did.21 2 Again, the Sixth Circuit appeared to reason that if a
particular anti-gay rights enactment is given effect on a statewide level then this
raises the "inevitable inference" of animosity, but if the same, exact type of
enactment is given effect on a municipal or city level, then the inference of
animosity is lacking.
The Sixth Circuit's logic should not be accepted. Such logic is fallacious for two
reasons. First, the scope of impact of Issue 3 is not significantly different than that
of Amendment 2. Second, the particular level of government at which an enactment
is effectuated is not determinative of the existence of an unconstitutional motivation
for such an enactment.
As discussed above, the Court in Romer found Amendment 2's scope conscience-
shocking due to the "limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute
206. Id.
207. See id.
208. One commentator justified the Court's approach as a disapproval of enactments which
stigmatize.
After all, what matters is whether the enactment stigmatizes the disfavored group,
not whether there is some high-minded reason for doing so. A statute based on or
reflective of the view that some citizens are worth less than others will be
stigmatizing, regardless of the subjective motives for its enactment.
Jackson, supra note 132, at 498.
209. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
210. See supra text accompanying note 199.
211. Hughes, supra note 133, at 175.
212. See Equality Found., 128 F.3d at 300 (declaring that the "passage of the Cincinnati
Charter Amendment was not facially animated solely by an impermissible naked desire of a
majority of the City's residents to injure an unpopular group of citizens, rather than to legally
actualize their individual and collective interests and preferences'T).
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ordinary civic life" '213 to which gays and lesbians would have no protection from
discrimination. In other words, the Court emphasized the effects upon the horizontal
components of the Equal Protection Clause that such enactments would have. In
comparison, Issue 3 immediately impacts these horizontal components. Particularly,
the passage of Issue 3 voided the EEO, which protected homosexuals from
discrimination in city hiring practices, and invalidated the HRO, which prohibited
private discrimination against gays and lesbians in employment, housing, or public
accommodations.214 When the Court in Romer stated, "laws of the kind now before
us" give rise to the inference that the enactment was born of animosity,2 5 the Court
was speaking of those laws which specifically exclude an unpopular class of
persons from protection against discrimination in those endeavors which make up
ordinary civic life. Because Issue 3 is this kind of law, the Sixth Circuit's argument
that Issue 3 was not motivated by animus because its scope of impact is less than
that of Amendment 2 fails to hold water.
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit focused upon the scope of impact Issue 3 would have
upon the vertical component of equal protection. It distinguished Issue 3 on the
grounds that, unlike Amendment 2, an opponent of Issue 3 would not have to
procure an amendment to the Ohio constitution as a precondition to changing the
local law, but instead would only have to undertake the task of procuring an
amendment to the city charter." 6 This distinction is not as compelling as it may
initially seem. Although the Sixth Circuit argues that there is a great difference
between a city charter provision and a state constitution, the district court
concluded that they were in fact very similar. It asserted:
The City Charter is the primary governance document of the city, akin to a
constitution .... As such, any and all laws, regulations, ordinances or policies of
the City of Cincinnati-with the exception of other charter provisions-are
inferior, and any legislation or policy to the contrary is invaid ....
.. [A] provision of the City charter may not be repealed short of amending
the charter itself.2 7
Moreover, the district court noted that the charter amendment process is a very
difficult task requiring a city wide campaign, as well as the support of the majority
of the voters.2"'
Again, the Sixth Circuit's distinction fails to hold much water. It is erroneous to
assume that in all circumstances it would be easier for a group to seek an
amendment to a city charter or pursue favorable legislation from county or other
state agencies than it would be to seek an amendment to a state constitution. One
can easily imagine a situation in which a group is an extremely small minority in a
particular city or county, but constitutes a majority in the state. One can also
213. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631; see also supra text accompanying note 169.
214. See EqualityFound., 128 F.3d at 291-92.
215. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634.
216. See Equality Found., 128 F.3d at 297.
217. Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417,428
(S.D. Ohio 1994) (citations omitted), rev'd and vacated, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated,
518 U.S. 1001 (1996).
218. See id.
1016 [Vol. 74:991
"DISTINCTIONS WITHO UT A DIFFERENCE"
imagine a circumstance in which a political minority in a particular state would
have a more difficult time securing a favorable amendment to the state constitution
than to secure a favorable amendment to the United States Constitution.
21 9
Thus, using the logic of the Sixth Circuit, the Court inRomer would have been
as equally wrong as the court in Equality Foundation 1I had it upheld Amendment
2 based on the fact that gays and lesbians could still pursue favorable legislation at
the higher national level. This the Romer Court did not do. As a result, the
constitutional implications of Romer must be that enactments motivated by animus
towards homosexuals on a municipal level are no less repugnant to equal protection
than enactments motivated by animus towards homosexuals on a statewide level.
To hold otherwise is simply not logical, nor constitutional.
In sum, the Sixth Circuit failed to employ the same heightened level of the
rational basis test employed by the Court in Romer, which focused upon the
legitimate ends and not merely upon any conceivable justification. Additionally, the
Sixth Circuit failed to significantly distinguish the scope of impact of Issue 3 from
Amendment 2, and thus, failed to put forth any credible argument which
distinguished the animosity out of which Issue 3 was born from the animosity which
begot Amendment 2.
IV. CONCLUSION
"Whether or not we agree with the majority decision in Romer, we are of course
obligated by law to give rulings of the Supreme Court full force and effect."22 This
Note has argued that the Sixth Circuit did not give the Supreme Court's ruling in
Romer such full force and effect. Although R6mer was somewhat confusing and
ambiguous, the Sixth Circuit ultimately showed its displeasure with Romer in its
attempt to undermine, distinguish, and limit it.
The debate over gay rights came to a pinnacle when the Supreme Court ruled in
Romer that the Equal Protection Clause protected homosexuals. Clearly, the Court
in Romer found Amendment 2 so repugnant to the Equal Protection Clause that the
traditional equal protection analysis was not even necessary to strike the
amendment down. Yet, even applying a heightened rational basis test, the Court
struck Amendment 2 down because it declared that enactments begot from
animosity for a singled-out group can serve no legitimate end. The Sixth Circuit in
upholding Issue 3 displayed their reluctance to accept the Court's decision in
Romer. The fallacious logic in the Sixth Circuit's attempt to distinguish the two
cases was obvious. The Supreme Court cannot possibly be understood to support
legislation at the municipal level which it so abhors at the state level. Therefore, in
the end, Equality Foundation / stands as a misconstruction of the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Romer.
219. This idea is indeed the very foundation upon which our federal government is built.
220. Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, Nos. 94-3855, 94-3973,
94-4280, 1998 WL 101701, at *5 (6th Cir. Feb. 5, 1998) (Gilman, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en bane).
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